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MOVING PREFERENCES AND SITES IN DEMOCRATIC LIFE
PREFERENCES AND PATERNALISM
On Freedom and Deliberative Democracy
CHRISTIAN F. ROSTBØLL
Columbia University
This article discusses the relationship between the ideal of autonomous preference formation
and the danger of paternalism in deliberative democratic theory. It argues that the aim of autono-
mous preference formation can and should be decoupled from a justification of paternalistic
state action aimed at reshaping citizens’preferences. The problem of nonautonomous preference
formation is rooted in the communication structure in which each and every one forms her prefer-
ences and hence cannot be solved by some paternalistically judging on others’behalf. The argu-
ment is based on a new formulation of the deliberative democratic ideal, which emphasizes and
clarifies the multiple dimensions of freedom it incorporates.
Keywords: deliberative democracy; freedom; paternalism; preference formation;
autonomy
Citizens do not always know what is in their own best interest. Their
political action and inaction often go contrary to what would be best for them.
It would be better if they formed their political opinions and wills differently,
more autonomously. Statements such as these underlie some important
strands of deliberative democratic theory and are inevitably met with the
charge of paternalism. The interesting thing is that both sides of this debate
appeal to freedom, albeit to different dimensions of freedom. The delibera-
tive democrat is concerned with the dimension of freedom that has to do with
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the autonomous formation of political preferences; the antipaternalist is con-
cerned with the freedom to form one’s own preferences without interference.
To go beyond this opposition, we must develop a model of deliberative
democracy that is normatively committed to multiple dimensions of free-
dom. The normative appeal of deliberative democracy is best understood in
terms of the way it incorporates several dimensions of freedom. A clarifica-
tion of this characteristic shows why such a theory actually supports skepti-
cism toward paternalism. Thus, I intend to decouple deliberative democratic
theory from the justification of paternalistic state action aimed at reshaping
citizens’ preferences.
The need for a clarification of the normative commitment to a wider the-
ory of freedom is especially urgent if we see deliberative democracy as a crit-
ical theory, as I think we should. Critical theory is intrinsically linked to a
multidimensional theory of freedom—because of its concern with emanci-
pation from all forms of oppression—and committed to clarifying the stan-
dards in light of which social criticism is made.1 As critical theory, delibera-
tive democracy should contribute to the analysis of which aspects of
contemporary society limit our prospects for enjoying the multiple dimen-
sions of freedom to which it is normatively committed. But it should also
contribute to the investigation of whether it is possible to free ourselves from
certain forms of oppression without creating new ones, as, for example,
paternalism. It is this latter issue that is the main concern of this article. I
argue that we can and should sever the close connection between the concern
with autonomous preference formation and the justification of paternalism
by means of a more complex account of the relationship between deliberative
democracy and freedom.
Two dimensions of freedom are familiar, namely, political freedom and
individual freedom, or the freedom of the ancients and that of the moderns.
Deliberative democrats have attempted to reconcile these two dimensions.2
But, even if these attempts are judged to be successful, deliberative demo-
crats still face another challenge. An important part of the critical edge of the
theory of deliberative democracy is that it problematizes the status of the
preferences people happen to have. It does not regard preferences and inter-
ests as brute facts that uncritically can serve as input to legitimate democratic
decision making. It thematizes the possibility that preferences can be non-
autonomously formed and that they can be unjustifiable to others in public
deliberation.3 The first issue brings into the picture a third dimension of free-
dom, which has played a crucial role in the development of the theory of
deliberative democracy. A main assumption in this development has been
that the formation of preferences is endogenous to social conditions and
political institutions. It is for this reason we should go beyond seeing the
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democratic process merely as one of aggregating preferences. But the point is
not substituting transformation for aggregation of preferences. The point is
that transformation is inevitable. What makes the difference normatively is
what kind of transformation political preferences undergo in the political
process. There is an underlying concern here that can best be expressed in
terms of a theory of freedom. The concern for how and under what conditions
our political preferences are formed is a concern for autonomy. I see the issue
of autonomous preference formation as a third dimension of freedom within
a broader theory of freedom. This theory includes one more dimension of
freedom than the three already mentioned, one that has not gained the
attention it deserves; namely, freedom as a form of status.
Thus, we arrive at four main dimensions of freedom. In addition to (1)
political freedom and (2) individual freedom, we have (3) autonomous pref-
erence formation and (4) freedom as status. None of these dimensions of
freedom are exclusive to deliberative democratic theory, but I maintain that
the latter has a unique ability to incorporate all four dimensions and that it can
supply new and valuable interpretations of them.4
Earlier theories of deliberative democracy have not paid sufficient atten-
tion to the multiple dimensions of freedom. I highlight the importance of the
issue of autonomous preference formation, while showing some pitfalls in
focusing exclusively on this dimension of freedom. For this purpose, a criti-
cal analysis of the works of Jon Elster and Cass Sunstein is most instructive.
Elster and Sunstein give the issue of autonomous preference formation cen-
ter stage.5 They both explicitly aim to clarify conceptions of autonomy that
can be coupled with the theory of deliberative democracy. Not all proponents
of deliberative democracy follow either of the two directly, but I believe that
the two represent exemplary articulations of the idea that democratic theory
should be concerned not merely with aggregation but also with transforma-
tion of preferences that underlies most versions of deliberative democracy.6
The idea of endogenous preference formation, which is at the center of both
Elster’s and Sunstein’s theories, is the key to that contrast. I argue that the
connection between this idea and a broader theory of freedom needs to be
clarified.
By analyzing Elster’s and Sunstein’s theories from the perspective of a
theory including multiple dimensions of freedom, we can see that what they
regard as necessary in order that preferences are not adaptive runs counter to
some other ideas of what freedom requires. I share with Elster and Sunstein
the basic idea that autonomy cannot be identical with want satisfaction
because the wants might not themselves be autonomously formed. But nei-
ther of their theories gives us an understanding of autonomous preferences
that can be combined with a commitment to the other dimensions of freedom.
372 POLITICAL THEORY / June 2005
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I concentrate on two other dimensions of freedom that are crucial to a full
understanding of autonomous preference formation, particularly if we want
to avoid charges of paternalism. The first dimension is the status conception
of freedom that refers to the treatment of each other as capable of giving and
responding to reasons in the process of public deliberation. The other dimen-
sion is the freedom of being subject only to laws that are the product of
deliberative processes in which one is able to take part.
It has been overlooked that the way of articulating the issue of autono-
mous preference formation, of which Elster’s and Sunstein’s theories are
exemplary, is difficult if not impossible to connect to the other dimensions of
freedom that deliberative democrats should care about. The common prob-
lem with their approaches is that they see nonautonomous preference forma-
tion as an individual problem that some citizens have. In Elster’s work, this
leads to a too narrow focus on individual-psychological factors and to a
neglect of the political and intersubjective dimensions of freedom, while it in
Sunstein’ work leads to a justification of state paternalism. In contrast to
these approaches, I see nonautonomous preference formation as a problem
for all citizens. The problem is the communication structure of society
in which each and every one forms her political preferences. We should
see public deliberation as a collective learning process in which no one
can form her political opinions freely unless everyone does so. If we do
this, he very possibility that some paternalistically can make others autono-
mous from without or by bypassing their critical faculties is shown to be
nonexistent.
NONCONSCIOUS PREFERENCE FORMATION:
ELSTER’S SOUR GRAPES
Elster’s discussion of sour grapes, or adaptive preferences, relates to dis-
cussions of deliberative democracy as a critique of the mere aggregation of
preferences as the best means to determine just outcomes. The question he
poses is as follows:
[W]hy should individual want satisfaction be the criterion of justice and social choice
when individual wants themselves may be shaped by a process that preempts the choice?
And in particular, why should the choice between feasible options only take account of
individual preferences if people tend to adjust their aspirations to their possibilities?7
In other words, why care about people’s choices, if they have not formed their
choices freely? Thus, Elster is clearly concerned with a problem concerning
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freedom. But it is not clear exactly what the problem for freedom is and
whether there is any way around it.
“Adaptive preference formation is the adjustment of wants to the possibil-
ities—not the deliberate adaptation favoured by character planners, but a
causal process occurring non-consciously.”8 Elster contrasts adaptive prefer-
ence formation to character planning, as advocated by Stoic, Buddhist, or
Spinozistic philosophies,9 and makes a “distinction between the causally
induced and the intentionally engineered adaptation of preferences to possi-
bilities.”10 The latter part of the distinction refers to character planning and is
seen by Elster as “much more compatible with autonomy than are either
manipulated preferences or adaptive ones,”11 for “it is better to adapt to the
inevitable through choice than by non-conscious resignation.”12
Is Elster right that consciousness and choice always are better and more
compatible with autonomy than nonconscious adaptation? They might be so
only under certain conditions. Most seriously, the idea of character planning
might be a dead end that can stand in the way of emancipation. One problem
with the idea of character planning is that we might not be satisfied with call-
ing a person’s preferences autonomous merely because they are consciously
and reflexively formed. Like the contemporary Spinozistic theory of free will
advanced by Harry Frankfurt, Elster sees autonomy as characterized by
meta-preferences shaping first-order preferences.13 Meta-preferences are
reflexive preferences about which first-order preferences should be one’s
effective will. Now, it is possible that something a person does from a meta-
preference is something that she was made to do by “irrelevant causal influ-
ences”; that is, influences that detract from autonomy and rationality.14 The
power structures, the social norms, and even the educational system of con-
temporary society might be such that they make some people reflexively
endorse subordinate positions and unfair treatment. So even if a person con-
sciously endorses her preferences it does not necessarily mean that the
endorsement is arrived at freely. The mere form of reflexivity does not con-
tribute to freedom if there is no qualitative difference between first-order
preferences and reflexive ones.15 Elster admits that meta-preferences might
be adaptive,16 but then it is not clear why their existence would contribute to
freedom at all.
According to Elster, an advantage with character planning is that it makes
it possible to “shape one’s wants to coincide exactly with . . . one’s possi-
bilities, whereas adaptive preferences do not lend themselves to such fine-
tuning.”17 Adaptive preferences tend to overshoot; that is, to adapt more than
necessary, to make one want even less than is actually possible. It is important
to emphasize three points here. First, character planning or adjusting one’s
wants to the possibilities only matters if one has knowledge of the possibili-
374 POLITICAL THEORY / June 2005
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ties. It is true that nonconscious preference formation excludes the possibility
of fine-tuning, but being conscious does not change anything unless one has
adequate knowledge of the external world.
Second, character planning is aimed at changing the self, not at changing
the external world. As such it is concerned with inner freedom rather than
political freedom.18 Elster holds that character planning “could never detract
from” autonomy.19 But could it not? The Stoic view where freedom is a mat-
ter of controlling one’s self by either adapting to the world or making oneself
as independent of it as possible might, I think, detract from the possibility of
forming autonomous preferences about the world. The Stoic view of the rela-
tionship between the self and external world is characterized by resignation.
Epictetus’s The Handbook, for example, is in the main a prescription of how
to avoid disappointments.20 But anyone who has been politically active
knows that politics is filled with failed hopes. The Stoics concentrate on the
control of one’s own character because that is something that seems to be “up
to us,” as opposed to the organization of the external world, which is seen as
“not up to us.”21 In a sense they are right, political action does, because it
involves a multiplicity of actors, set in motion chains of cause and effect, the
results of which the actors cannot entirely control. The Stoic ideal of master-
ship and control of self can be achieved only by turning away from the unpre-
dictability of acting with others and turning inward. In this way it expounds a
view of freedom that is essentially nonpolitical.22 Of course, it matters how
one has come to hold one’s view that it is better to change the self than the
world. Under certain conditions I could imagine that this would be the best
alternative; sometimes there really are no possibilities for changing the world
to fit one’s preferences, and adjusting to this fact might then be the most rea-
sonable thing to do. My point is that sometimes character planning can
detract from autonomy, namely, when it is not even considered whether the
world could be different and is accepted uncritically. The character planner
tends to see the world as independent of herself and hence is foreign to the
possibilities of collective, transformative action. Someone who has accepted
the status quo as inevitable and shaped her preferences accordingly, even if
she has done so reflectively, will not be open for a change of circumstances
that would give her greater autonomy. She has already endorsed her prefer-
ence and her circumstances. The danger is if she thinks she is free, because
then she has excluded the possibility that she could become freer or that there
are other dimensions of freedom. A preference that is consciously adopted,
combined with a belief that one is free, might stand more in the way of
freedom than an adaptive preference combined with no illusions about being
free.
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Third, a character planner has accommodationist preferences.23 An accom-
modationist preference is distinguished from an adaptive one by being con-
sciously formed. Accommodation is of course the only possibility for the one
seeking harmony between herself and the world and only seeks to change
herself. The problem here concerns not how the preference has been adapted—
consciously or nonconsciously—but what it has been accommodated to. It
seems that accommodation to the circumstances only becomes a problem for
freedom if there is in some sense something unfree about the way in which
one came to live under those circumstances.
My discussion of Elster has shown some problems regarding the issue of
adaptive preference formation as merely an inner issue. This perspective runs
the danger of leading to the idea that freedom can be attained by individually
becoming conscious of one’s adaptive preferences and reflectively fine-
tuning them to coincide exactly with the possibilities. This is a subjectivist
view of freedom that is antithetical to any idea of political freedom and also to
the idea that external circumstances matter for freedom. I do not deny that
consciousness of one’s preference formation matters for freedom, but the
way in which Elster has formulated the issue leads to a dead end where it can-
not be connected to the political and external dimensions of freedom, and
hence cannot be the basis for social criticism. And there is not any room here
for intersubjective processes of learning or for freedom as something that can
be attained in deliberation with others. In particular, there is a pitfall in the
idea of freedom as character planning insofar as people who reflexively
endorse their preferences and their adaptation to their possibilities think that
is sufficient for freedom. This view preempts any reflection regarding
whether there might be more that is required for being free. And it ignores
that the mere form of reflexivity does not exclude the possibility that citizens
have merely adopted—uncritically or even nonconsciously—their meta-
preferences from the society in which they live. To be free we must also
acquire our reflexive attitudes freely.
The idea of public deliberation gives us a better idea of what autonomy
requires. Participating in deliberation is, ideally, a way of going beyond the
mere fact of having meta-preferences and of scrutinizing one’s possibilities
on the basis of the available information. Deliberation triggers self-reflection
not only regarding one’s first-order preferences but also regarding one’s
reflexive preferences. It does so because one must be willing to defend one’s
opinions and give reasons for them to others and because one must be willing
to listen to the reasons others have for their views. The deliberative process
also imparts information about the world because this inevitably will be part
of the arguments given for different points of view. By participating in com-
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mon deliberation, our reflexive judgments become products of intersubjec-
tive learning. Common deliberation, thus, achieves the sought-for qualitative
difference between acting on first-order desires and acting on reflexive judg-
ment, because the latter alone is based on reasons and knowledge gained
intersubjectively. The difference from Elster and Frankfurt is that it is not the
reflexivity as such that matters. Rather, what makes a preference autonomous
is that it has survived a certain process. And this process is not merely an
internal and subjective one; it is one in which you can check your preferences
against the arguments of others. My preference is autonomous if I still find
reasons to hold it after I have heard the relevant arguments and considered the
relevant information. We thus get an intersubjectivity and a rationality
component absent in Elster and Frankfurt.
It might be objected that I here run into the problem of infinite regress; the
problem of how to avoid ascending to higher and higher levels to reach the
autonomous self without cutting the sequence off arbitrarily. In one way this
is true. Every result of deliberation is only temporary. I might hear new argu-
ments and learn about new information that make me change my mind. Thus
I learn that I did not have sufficient reason to hold my former view and hence
that it was not fully autonomous. But I do not think this is a problem. In fact, it
might be seen as what autonomy is all about: to be continually open to learn-
ing, to revise one’s views in the light of new arguments. This means that we
cannot define autonomy as a final state, as in Frankfurt’s harmony between
different levels of desires. The problem with Frankfurt’s view might exactly
be to see autonomy as a state of affairs, for seeing it thus inevitably leads to
the infinite regress problem. Rather, we should see autonomy as a process.
Autonomy, then, is to live under conditions in which one can engage with
others in deliberative practices that enable one continually to modify one’s
preferences and opinions in light of arguments.24
PREFERENCES AND PATERNALISM: SUNSTEIN
Like Elster, Sunstein is concerned with endogenous preference forma-
tion. His intervention arises from a concern to defend government regulation
and social redistribution. It is also part of an argument for deliberative
democracy, but this aim is not well integrated with the first aim, or so I argue.
It is a weakness of Sunstein’s account that it is unclear what the perspective
he is speaking from is and also who the agent of change should be. Both of
these questions need to be answered by a theory with critical-transformative
intent.
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Sunstein argues that democratic governments should not always respect
private preferences, because these preferences are “adaptive to a wide range
of factors—including the context in which the preference is expressed, the
existing legal rules, past consumption choices, and culture in general.”25 This
leads him to reject the notion of autonomy as preference satisfaction.
The notion of autonomy should refer instead to decisions reached with a full and vivid
awareness of available opportunities, with reference to all relevant information, and
without illegitimate or excessive constraints on the process of preference formation. When
these conditions are not met, decisions should be described as unfree or non-autonomous;
for this reason it is most difficult to identify autonomy with preference satisfaction.26
Given these commitments, Sunstein concludes, “A democratic government
should sometimes take private preferences as an object of regulation and con-
trol . . . and precisely in the interest of welfare and autonomy.”27
With this one-dimensional take on freedom and autonomy, Sunstein
opens himself up to the charge of paternalism, for who is to decide when a
preference is free, if not a paternalistic state? Sunstein’s requirements for
autonomy are so demanding that it is clear that no one will ever be autonomous,
and hence the state always is justified in overruling our—the citizens’—
preferences. There are two problems here. First, there is a danger in seeing
autonomy as a matter of either-or instead of as a matter of degree. It means
that someone who is not fully autonomous is not autonomous at all, and
hence you cannot violate her autonomy. Preferences that are not fully auton-
omous lose all worth.
Second, even if it is true that our preferences are not autonomous, it does
not mean that they can be made so by the action of an external authority, such
as Sunstein describes the state. According to Sunstein, “Respect for prefer-
ences that have resulted from unjust background conditions and that will lead
to human deprivation or misery hardly appears the proper course for a liberal
democracy.”28 Thus, he goes directly from the problem of adaptive prefer-
ence formation to a justification of state intervention. But this is too quick.
It is one thing to say that adaptive preference formation is damaging to free-
dom and quite another to say that adaptive preferences should not be
respected. We might try to solve the problem of adaptive preference forma-
tion while simultaneously respecting the preferences people actually have.
This requires that we bring in the process of public deliberation. In delibera-
tion, preferences must be respected, though we might seek to change each
other’s preferences through argument.
Sunstein says, “Social outcomes should not be based on existing prefer-
ences.”29 But that is an unfortunate way to put what deliberative democracy is
378 POLITICAL THEORY / June 2005
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about. Political decisions should be based on existing preferences; political
freedom requires that. The issue deliberative democrats should raise is how
existing preferences have been shaped. And the perspective we should take is
as critics in the public sphere who attempt to provoke reflection and contrib-
ute to processes of common deliberation.30 As critical theorists, we can ana-
lyze how certain conditions and processes are detrimental to the free forma-
tion of preferences. But we should never from an external perspective take
some preferences as not worthy of respect, and we should not see the state as
an instrument to changing these preferences from without. That would vio-
late both the negative and the political freedom of citizens. The normative
commitment to multiple dimensions of freedom entails that we only try to
change others’ preferences by attempting to persuade them or make them
reflect on their own situation and opinions. We cannot implement new
conditions before we have convinced each other of their justifiability.
Sunstein does in fact consider the ideas of deliberation and political free-
dom, but he separates them from the issue of preferences. According to
Sunstein, citizens should not decide “what they ‘want,’ but instead who they
are, what their values are, and what those values require.”31 Hereby he
excludes the possibility of changing one’s preferences about what one wants
in the process of deliberation and makes it the concern solely of the output
side of the state. Sunstein makes a too sharp distinction between wants and
values. Even if we in politics cannot be concerned with our own interests and
wants alone, it does not mean we cannot be concerned with them also. Politi-
cal decisions should not transcend what we want individually but include it.
Sunstein seems to want some preferences to be excluded before the process
of deliberation gets started. I, in contrast, argue that it must be in the process
of deliberation that it is decided what are and what are not “relevant prefer-
ences.” People should be allowed to bring their private desires and interests to
the process of deliberation; whether they should be satisfied must depend on
whether there are good arguments for their satisfaction. And whether the
preferences are autonomous must depend on whether people still hold them
after they have seen them in light of the reasons given and the information
imparted by public deliberation.
Sunstein makes the interesting observation that there often is a difference
between people’s wants as consumers in the market and their political val-
ues.32 This is a very important point to raise against those who say, “Hey, see
people really don’t want that” (those opera houses, speed limits, or whatever)
and then point to their private consumption choices as proof. Sunstein is right
to point out that the same people might have social aspirations and collective
judgments that go against their private behavior. But he is not precise enough
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in relating this to the public process of deliberation and to the idea of self-
legislation. The problem with his perspective is that he, exactly as those he
criticizes, speaks on others’behalf. Sunstein’s response to the objector to reg-
ulation is, “Yes, that is what they really want—as citizens.” But it is exactly
such an observer’s perspective that public deliberation and respect for the
multiple dimensions of freedom of citizens demand that we abandon. A basic
normative commitment of deliberative democracy should be that everyone
must speak for herself. It is crucial to emphasize that it is in public delibera-
tion that we form our legitimate collective judgments and justify laws that
might overrule our private desires. And, hence, it is only as participants in
public deliberation that we can know what each other’s political values are.
This cannot be determined by observing theorists or judges, and not by opin-
ion polls either. Consequently, there would be no question of the state’s not
respecting people’s preferences and attempting to control them. It would be
citizens themselves who formulate what their collective aspirations are and
how they should relate to their own private desires.
The objections I have raised against Sunstein have their roots in a tension
between a substantial commitment to state regulation and an argument for
solving political problems through processes of public deliberation. Sunstein
represents the tendency to weigh substantial commitments higher than
respect for the democratic genesis of law through public deliberation. Delib-
erative democracy, however, should not only be concerned with the effects of
the output of the state but also focus on the input. It makes a difference
whether we see adaptive preference formation as an issue that should be
solved by a state that takes an objective attitude (in P. F. Strawson’s sense)33
toward its citizens or whether we see it as an issue to be dealt with in public
deliberation generating legitimate law. In the democratic genesis of law, we
have to show respect for each other’s preferences, even if they are the result of
adaptation to unjust background conditions, not the least because we never
will arrive at the situation of perfect justice and full autonomy. Instead of see-
ing the possibility of adaptive preferences as a direct justification for not
respecting preferences, the thematization of the issue should be seen as a con-
tribution to public deliberation. As critics in the public sphere, theorists of
deliberative democracy should provoke deliberation about possible adaptive
preferences, but they do not have the final word on the issue. They “are suc-
cessful not in so far as they bring agents to particular true insights, but rather
in so far as they initiate processes of self-reflection, the outcome of which
agents determine for themselves.”34
Now, Sunstein might object that he is not arguing for imposing anything
on anybody. The social justice measures he proposes should, of course, be
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subject to debate and democratic voting. But this response misses the point.
My argument is primarily directed at a too simplistic account of autonomy.
Sunstein might say that he wants to combine this with a theory of deliberation
and political freedom; my point is that he has not done so. But the argument
also has institutional implications. Sunstein’s account of autonomy will be
less critical of forms of policy making that are isolated from popular partici-
pation and common deliberation than a theory that wants to combine the con-
cern for autonomous preference formation with a concern for political free-
dom and the respect for each and every one as an authority on matters of
common concern.35
In a couple of recent articles, Sunstein has made an argument in favor of
what he and his coauthor Richard Thaler call “libertarian paternalism.” Like
the work discussed previously, this argument relies heavily on the premise of
endogenous preference formation. The argument differs from Sunstein’s
argument concerning deliberative democracy by not being concerned with
the effects of preference formation on the political process but by being con-
cerned with welfare alone.36 But it is instructive to see again what the empiri-
cal data that show that preferences often lack rationality and autonomy are
believed to justify.
Libertarian paternalism is “an approach that preserves freedom of choice
but that encourages both private and public institutions to steer people in
directions that will promote their own welfare.”37 Sunstein and Thaler’s argu-
ment is based on two main premises: first, there are no viable alternatives to
paternalism; second, paternalism does not always involve coercion. To illus-
trate the argument that there are no viable alternatives to paternalism, they
give the following example:
Consider the problem facing the director of a company cafeteria who discovers that the
order in which food is arranged influences the choices people make. To simplify, consider
three alternative strategies: (1) she could make choices that she thinks would make the
customers best off; (2) she could make choices at random; or (3) she could maliciously
choose those items that she thinks would make the customers as obese as possible.
Option 1 appears to be paternalistic, which it is, but would anyone advocate option 2
or 3? 38
That the arrangement of the food influences the choices the customers make
is an example of a number of ways in which behavioral economics and cogni-
tive psychology research have shown that context shapes choice.39 I do not
have a quarrel with this research but with what is done with it. Paternalism is
inevitable, according to Sunstein and Thaler, because (1) the director has to
make a choice about the arrangement of the food and (2) options 2 and 3 are
Rostbøll / PREFERENCES AND PATERNALISM 381
 at Copenhagen University Library on October 22, 2009 http://ptx.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
not viable. It is undeniable that a choice has to be made (though it is less clear
why it is the director who has to make it and why she knows better). But is it
really true that option 2 is such a far-fetched option? Would it not be prefera-
ble in terms of freedom that the food be arranged randomly than that the
director places the food in an order that makes the customers buy what she
believes is best for them? Sunstein and Thaler propose that institutional plan-
ners (“anyone who must design plans for others, from human resource direc-
tors, to bureaucrats, to kings”)40 study what behavioral economics and cogni-
tive psychology can tell them about how people choose as a result of different
institutional designs, default options, starting points, and so on, and on this
basis steer people in a direction that will promote the latter’s welfare. Then, to
meet the concerns of the libertarian, they note that this form of paternalism is
not coercive because it leaves people free to choose. The cafeteria director
puts the unhealthy food in the back but does not make it unavailable; the
employer makes her preferred pension savings plan the default option but
makes it possible for the employees to opt out. But only a very crude notion of
coercion would see this as coercion free. Coercion is a matter not merely of
making options unavailable but also of raising the costs of certain options.
What we witness is an argument for making people feel free by giving them
the choice between a number of options while the institutional planners
design the context so they achieve the desired outcome. The main objection
to this way of thinking is the objectivating attitude it takes toward the sub-
jects. The customers in the cafeteria and the employees choosing pension
plans are treated as not being responsive to reasons but as mere objects that
react in calculable and predictable ways to default rules, framing effects,
starting points, and so on.41 If this is true, then there is more respect in
randomness.
This discussion gives us even more reason to emphasize the political
dimension of freedom. In cases where some decisions need to be made by
“planners,” the notion of negative freedom does not help us very much, and
the decision cannot be made in anticipation of what choices people would
make if the choices people make depend on the options they have: there
would be no clear preferences to track.42 The fact that institutional rules affect
the choices made gives us a good reason to make these institutional rules the
object of reflection and collective decision making. So does the fact that
steering choices, even if less oppressive than making certain choices unavail-
able, hardly can be seen as noncoercive. This does not mean that all areas of
life should be democratized and no tasks could be delegated; for example, to
bureaucratic agencies. But it does mean that the only way in which we can
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avoid paternalism is by making institutional rules subject to democratic
legitimation.
PATERNALISM
It is a classical problem that in attempting to remove one form of oppres-
sion we impose another. Sunstein fails on this count because in his argument
for state intervention for the sake of the autonomy of the subjects, he accepts
paternalism. I have made this criticism from the perspective of an under-
standing of deliberative democracy as committed to multiple dimensions of
freedom. To elaborate this perspective and show why it must be critical of
paternalism, I spell out what exactly paternalism is, when it is at play, and
why it is objectionable.43
Gerald Dworkin helpfully defines an act as paternalistic if it “constitutes
an attempt to substitute one person’s judgment for another’s, to promote the
latter’s benefit.”44 Any form of paternalism involves a person or a group of
persons believing that she or it knows better what is in the best interest of
another or others and attempts to impose her or its view on others. It is a case
of legal paternalism when the judgment of the first party is backed by law,
which in the last instance means that it is backed by force. A political system
is paternalistic if it gives some the authority to judge on others’ behalf what
they believe promotes the latter’s benefit.
Acting paternalistically entails that the subject does not know what is in
her interest or what is good for her. But there is an ambiguity in saying that the
subject does not know what is in her interest or what is good for her. It could
mean that the person is mistaken about what her interests are or about what
best serves her interests; that is, she can be seen as mistaken about either her
ends or her means, or both. Regarding ends, note that the subject of a pater-
nalistic act does not necessarily object because she does not share the end or
good promoted but because she does not see it as the highest good.45 Thus a
smoker who is against paternalistic smoking regulations might agree that
health is a good, but she does not agree that it is the highest good. She might
think it is a higher good to live well than to live for a long time. The judgment
that the paternalist wants to substitute for that of the subject is, thus, a com-
posite not only of what is good but also of what is best and of how best to
achieve this end. This leads to three different forms of justification for pater-
nalistic legislation: (1) people do not know what is good for themselves, (2)
people do not know what is best for themselves (they do not have the right
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priorities), and (3) people do not know how to achieve what is good for
themselves.
These forms leave out another candidate for justifications of paternalism;
namely, weakness of will. If we accept that it is possible for a person to know
what is good for herself, to have the right priorities, and to know how to
achieve her ends and nevertheless fail to act accordingly, then there seems to
be a prima facie justification for intervention. Among proponents of deliber-
ative democracy, Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, for example, see
protecting against weakness of will as an act of paternalism and as being jus-
tified.46 But I do not think it is a case of paternalism at all. When another per-
son or the law helps me do what I judge it best to do, or refrain from doing
what I judge it detrimental to do, it is reinforcing my own judgment rather
than putting another’s judgment in its place. So according to the definition I
have appropriated from Dworkin, acts that adjust for weakness of will are not
paternalistic—which is not to say that they are always justified.
The focus on judgment in this definition is important. If we instead
defined a paternalist act as one that goes contrary to the subject’s operative
preference,47 acts and laws adjusting for weakness of will would be paternal-
istic. But I think it is important to be able to distinguish between acts or laws
that go against the subject’s own judgment and those that reinforce her judg-
ment against her weakness of will or some (ephemeral) operative preference.
We see an important difference between the two in the ways in which they
address their subjects. In the case of paternalistic acts, the subject is treated as
incapable of judgment; in the second case she is seen as incapable of follow-
ing through on her own judgments. But the most important difference is that
the latter type can be self-imposed, while paternalistic acts cannot. Gutmann
and Thompson’s idea of “self-imposed paternalism” seems to me an oxymo-
ron.48 Paternalism implies that someone else thinks she knows better than I do
what is good for me and attempts to impose it on me, against my own judg-
ment, for my own good. Self-imposition requires that I knew what was good
for me, but that is exactly what the paternalist denies. But it is possible for me
to impose on myself or ask others to impose on me constraints that help me
overcome my weakness of will. Of course, legislation aimed at adjusting for
weakness of will might, when accepted by a majority only, follow the judg-
ment of some, while being paternalistic toward others. But then we are back
to the case of some judging on behalf of others what are in the latter’s best
interest. And it is for this reason—that is sets the judgment of some over the
judgment of others—that the legislation should be seen as paternalistic, and
not because it sets judgment over operative preference. To be sure, the practi-
cal need for decision making according to the majority principle leads to fur-
384 POLITICAL THEORY / June 2005
 at Copenhagen University Library on October 22, 2009 http://ptx.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
ther difficulties, because the deciding self is not coterminous with the
affected self.49
Can Deliberation Be Paternalistic?
Procedure and Substance
The idea of deliberative democracy as committed to multiple dimensions
of freedom entails, in contrast to the position Sunstein is representative of,
that citizens’preferences must be respected and changed only as part of a pro-
cess of public deliberation. I now elaborate and defend this position more
fully in light of what I have said about the concept of paternalism. I do so by
way of a response to Dworkin’s claim that “it is not as if rational argument
cannot be paternalistic while brute force must be. Some people may want to
make their decisions impulsively, without rational deliberation; insisting that
they hear rational argument (for their own good) is paternalism.”50
Let us consider in what sense, if at all, rational argument might be consid-
ered a case of having one person’s judgment substituted for another’s, for the
sake of the latter. First we must distinguish between imposing a substantial
judgment on another and imposing (a judgment about) which decision-
procedure to follow. Dworkin seems to be concerned with the latter, but I
begin by explaining why deliberation cannot be seen as a matter of imposing
substantial judgments on others, and then I return to the issue of procedure.
My argument for public deliberation as connected to a theory of multiple
dimensions of freedom does rely on the idea that people do not always know
what is in their own best interest. Public deliberation should aim not only at
coordinating action and determining collective goals but also at gaining
greater insights into what is in our best interest individually and collec-
tively.51 This description can lead some to suppose that deliberation is inher-
ently paternalistic. But it is not paternalistic to point out that people might be
mistaken about their own interests; it only becomes so if one thinks one
knows better and attempts to substitute one’s own judgment for another’s.
Deliberation does not work by imposing one person’s judgment on others. It
should rather be thought of as a joint activity of mutual learning. As I see it,
one of the basic premises of deliberative democracy is that no one has privi-
leged access to and uncriticizable beliefs about what the true interests of any-
one are. In deliberation, it is true, there is a substitution of one judgment for
another, but it is not of mine for yours, rather of what results from delibera-
tion for both of them.
It could be objected that usually a person goes into an argument to substi-
tute her own judgment for her listener’s. To be sure, this can be the motivation
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for entering an argument, but this in itself clearly does not constitute a pro-
cess of deliberation. The process of deliberation cannot be reduced to the
motivations of those who enter it. While the reason for entering argument can
be paternalistic, there is something about the process of argumentation that
makes it defy being so. This is because the addressee of an argument will be
able to accept or reject the argument in light of her own judgment, if nothing
but argument is involved. If the initiator of the argument is able to prevent the
addressee from considering the argument on its merits, it will be not by
means of argument but rather by means of something external to it such as
superior power or manipulation.52 In that case, what makes the act paternalis-
tic is not the argument but the first person’s ability to avoid a real argument
from taking place, using forces external to argument itself. Thus, as speech
acts, arguments do not fit the definition of paternalistic acts. That is also the
case because they are directed at a person’s conscious and reflective capaci-
ties and hence can be either accepted or rejected by the recipient on the basis
of her own judgment. This is why I do not think arguments can be said to be
irrelevant causal influences in the sense that they limit our freedom. Irrele-
vant causal influences can be characterized by their bypassing our reflective
capacities.53 It makes a difference whether, on one side, another’s judgment
has been substituted for mine without my knowing it (as in the case of manip-
ulation) or by means of overt force, or, on the other side, I have come to
rationally accept this judgment as my own.
The preceding arguments, however, require that people deliberate in the
first place. They apply only to persons who have already accepted participat-
ing in deliberation. So let us return to Dworkin’s point that “insisting that
[impulsive people] hear rational argument (for their own good) is paternal-
ism.” The situation here is not one of the substitution of another’s substantive
judgment for one’s own but one of the substitution of another’s preferred
decision-procedure for one’s own. That is, it is not a case of A insisting that B
do x rather than y for her own sake, but of A insisting that B follow a certain
procedure before she decides whether to do x or y for her own sake. And it is
clearly the insisting that Dworkin calls paternalistic, not the rational argu-
ment. But what is meant by “insisting”? Let us consider two examples
regarding legal paternalism, one that relates to the output side of the state and
one that relates to the democratic genesis of law.
Consider a law that requires a woman who wants to have an abortion to go
to counseling before she gains the right to have it.54 Suppose this law is made
for the sake of the autonomy of the woman in the sense that her choice will
only reflect what she really wants if it is made after having considered the
pros and cons of the case.55 This is a case of insisting that someone hear ratio-
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nal arguments before she makes up her mind. Note that the complaint against
such a law would most likely not be against rational arguments as such but be
against being forced to listen to them. The complaint would be against the
legal rule not the argument. If one were against arguments as such, one would
have to be in favor of prohibiting from the public sphere arguments that make
pregnant women reflect on whether to have an abortion. A law forcing people
to listen to arguments for their own good before they make personal choices
would be paternalistic, I contend, but a law that allows arguments in the pub-
lic sphere meant to make people reflect on their choices is not. The difference
is that in the first case people are forced to do something independently of
their own judgment, while in the latter case they will only listen to the argu-
ments if they so choose. I draw this distinction not merely to affirm the impor-
tance of free speech but to argue that an increase in public deliberation
should not be seen as a threat to freedom. As long as citizens have the right
not to participate in public deliberation, the negative dimension of freedom
has been respected. The problem with obligatory abortion counseling is the
lack of a right to say no; it is paternalistic when it is justified with reference to
one’s own good.
The second example, relevant to the democratic genesis of law, is the idea
that people would be given the right to vote only if they took part in public
deliberation. Suppose that such a law was justified with reference to the fact
that many individuals vote contrary to their own best interests. Justified in
this way, the law is paternalistic vis-à-vis those who would prefer to make up
their mind about how to vote without participating in public deliberation. But
again the objection would be not that arguments are paternalistic per se but
that being forced to listen to them is. The problem for deliberative democracy
in this connection is not that deliberation as such is paternalistic but that it is
impotent by itself in face of those who do not want to listen. To increase par-
ticipation in deliberation, one might have to use nondeliberative means such
as rewards or punishments. Deliberative democracy, as I see it, does not by its
very idea outlaw using the law to promote participation in deliberation. But I
do not think the justification for such laws should be a paternalistic one.
Rather than being justified by reference to the good of the person herself, it
would have to be justified by reference to the fact that when we act politically
we make choices that not only affect ourselves but affect everybody.56 So any
argument for institutions and laws that make people take part in deliberation
before they vote—or encourage them to do so—should not be justified with
reference to their own good but be justified with reference to the idea that
they are not merely exercising power over themselves, rather also over
others.
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In these two examples the negative dimension of freedom, the freedom
from coercive interference, also shows its importance. But my argument
shows that we should be careful not to confuse this dimension of freedom
with the idea that public deliberation in itself encroaches on freedom. Or at
least we should be able to distinguish coercive interference from the unavoid-
able and unobjectionable “interference” posed by the existence in one’s soci-
ety of arguments that contradict one’s own convictions.
SELF-LEGISLATION AND FREEDOM AS STATUS
There are some arguments against paternalism that are inherent to the
deliberative democratic perspective. These arguments become clearer when
we explicate the dimensions of freedom this perspective must be normatively
committed to. What distinguishes the paternalist and the deliberative demo-
cratic point of view is not that one holds that people do not know what is good
for themselves, while the other thinks they do. The difference is rather that
the paternalist believes she knows what is good for others and feels herself
justified in imposing her judgment on others, while the deliberative democrat
believes that what is right must be justified and accepted in deliberation. A
basic assumption underlying deliberative democracy, as I see it, is that no one
has privileged access to truth or to the true interests of others. The only way to
arrive at judgments that have the presumption of being right on their side is
through public processes of deliberation in which everyone is free and able to
participate.57
If subjects of paternalistic legislation have not been convinced of the
justifiability of the legislation, this legislation cannot be said to enhance their
autonomy58—though it might increase their welfare, an issue I leave aside. It
is on this issue I differ with Sunstein. From the standpoint of deliberative
democracy as normatively committed to multiple dimensions of freedom, we
can see why it is unsatisfactory to limit freedom to the idea that preferences
be formed consciously and under just circumstances. There are two dimen-
sions of freedom, both inherent to deliberative democracy, that Elster and
Sunstein neglect: freedom as self-legislation and freedom as status. Both
freedom as self-legislation and freedom as status are related to the freedom of
the ancients, but in the deliberative democratic reinterpretation of the latter it
is seen as involving two distinct dimensions.59
What is objectionable about paternalism from the deliberative democratic
point of view is that the paternalist does not want to go into an argument about
her own view but wants to impose it on the subject from without. This goes
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against the very idea of deliberation. Deliberation is about convincing, and
when a speaker is successful in convincing the hearer about her proposal, the
implementation of this proposal will be a case not of imposing the judgment
of the former on the latter but of the two having come to share judgment. This
leads us to the idea of self-legislation. Paternalism is a matter of some
attempting to judge and legislate on behalf of others for the latter’s own good,
while self-legislation is a matter of giving a law to oneself on the basis of
one’s own best judgment. On this understanding, laws given to oneself can
never be paternalistic, since they are reinforcing rather than going against
one’s own best judgment.
The paternalist’s attitude not only goes against freedom as self-legislation
but also goes against freedom as a form of status. Status can be seen as a
dimension of freedom.60 Freedom as status “identifies freedom as a position
occupied by a person within a particular political and social structure.”61
Deliberative democracy implies a specific view of what it is to be a citizen
and involves a particular understanding of freedom as status. The paternalist
does not recognize the status we must give each other for common delibera-
tion to succeed. In deliberation, we must respect the status of each other as
free persons, in the sense of persons worth arguing with and as persons who
can contribute and respond appropriately to reasons. Everyone must be given
the status of an authority on matters taken up in public deliberation.62 This
status is violated when others overrule our judgments and implement what
they deem good for us, even if it is something they believe will increase our
autonomy.
The argument for self-legislation will naturally be met by the majority-
minority objection. We need to distinguish more clearly than I have done
hitherto between “my judgment” and “our judgment.” Without consensus,
my judgment and the collective judgment that determines the decision do not
necessarily coincide. Consensus is rarely, if ever, forthcoming regarding
matters of legislation, the objection goes, and the majority who makes the
decision will thus judge on behalf of the rest. It is undeniable that consensus
rarely occurs in legislative politics, but it is true only up to a point that this
means that the majority has to impose their judgment on the minority. If there
has been an inclusive and free process of deliberation up to the point of deci-
sion making, then the freedom of even the minority has been respected in two
ways.
First, the results of deliberation are also products of the contributions
made by those who ended up in the minority. “Although the result does not
conform to all points of view, it is the result of the confrontation between
them.”63 This process constitutes for everyone freedom as being a participant
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in self-legislation. I distinguish being a participant in self-legislation from
being a self-legislator. The latter requires that you be in agreement with the
final decision made, while being a participant in self-legislation is possible
even if you disagree with the final result, as long as the final decision is also
affected by your contribution and as long as it is seen as fallible and reversible
and therefore subject to further debate by the demos as a whole. It is only
when we see democracy as a deliberative democracy that we see this possibil-
ity; that is, when we see that opinion formation is as important as the counting
of votes. It might be objected that this argument requires that the results of
democratic decision making be different because of the contributions made
by the outvoted minority and that this condition is not always fulfilled. But, if
we look not at isolated instances of decision making but at the long-term
effects of a more deliberative society, then the condition that all participants
actually do affect the decisions is harder to refute. Decision making will be
embedded in a different environment, which will affect the opinion and will
formation of everyone and hence will lead to different results.
Second, under these conditions, even if you end up in the minority, your
status is respected. The fact that the majority does not end up agreeing with
you does not mean that they have not listened to your arguments and given
theirs, and they have to respect it if you criticize their judgment and attempt to
change the decision made.
Thus, the fact that decisions in the end have to be made following the
majority principle does not mean that the argument for the antipaternalism of
deliberative self-legislation fails. A decision reached after public delibera-
tion is not merely a case of the judgment of the majority substituting for that
of the minority but a case of judgments clashing and resulting in something
new. And even if the outvoted minority must obey the decision made by the
majority until they can win the majority, they are not required to accept the
judgment behind the decision made as theirs.64
Note that these points concern procedures and not substance. It would be
wrong to say that if the substance of what the majority decides is just and it is
meant to promote the autonomy of the minority, then it is justified and does
promote autonomy. To be free is a matter not just of living under just laws or
under conditions that promote autonomous preference formation but of hav-
ing been personally convinced of what is right and of giving the law to one-
self on that basis. We cannot put in place new conditions before having
attempted to convince each other of their justifiability without violating both
freedom as status and freedom as being a participant in processes of self-
legislation. These are the requirements of the deliberative procedure that
exclude paternalism.
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CONCLUSION
The argument in this article is not meant as a rejection of any and all pater-
nalistic legislation. Rather, the aim has been to disentangle deliberative
democracy from paternalism; that is, to show that deliberative democracy is
not a particularly or inherently paternalistic model of democracy—even if
paternalistic legislation sometimes is agreed on as it is in any democracy.
Deliberative democracy does not require paternalistically disregarding peo-
ple’s existing political preferences for the sake of autonomous preference
formation. This can be seen from an analysis of what processes of public
deliberation require and by explicating the different dimensions of freedom
they imply.
If we do not see the issue of nonautonomous preferences in the broader
context of a theory of deliberative democracy normatively committed to mul-
tiple dimensions of freedom, we too easily end up in the paradoxical situation
of seeking to increase autonomy in ways that simultaneously undermine it.
Sunstein ends up in this predicament because he wants to make people’s pref-
erences autonomous in a way that disrespects their freedom as reason-
responsive beings and undermines the freedom of being participants in self-
legislation. Or we end up in a too narrow focus on the self at the cost of the
political and external dimensions of freedom, as I have argued that there is a
tendency to in Elster. The analysis of Elster and Sunstein also shows that one-
dimensional views of autonomy fail to give us standards in light of which
social criticism can be made. Elster’s idea of character-planning moves the
focus away from the importance of social circumstances, while Sunstein fails
to tell us the perspective from which criticism should be made and who the
agent of change should be.
Juxtaposing the idea of a normative commitment to multiple dimensions
of freedom to Elster and Sunstein matters particularly in terms of what we
think the possibility of adaptive preferences can justify. My argument entails
that the existence of adaptive preference formation cannot be used as a direct
or unmediated justification for state intervention. If we begin to set up exter-
nal standards for when people’s preferences are autonomous, then we have
betrayed the promise of deliberative democracy as a truly democratic model
committed to multiple dimensions of freedom; a model where standards
must be the product of processes that give each one of us the ability to learn
and contribute and that treats each one of us as responsive to reasons rather
than to authority and force. Critical theorists can raise the issue of adaptive
preferences in the public sphere but not solve it. For preferences to be autono-
mously formed, citizens need to have formed them by their own lights and
under conditions that they have been able to participate in the justification of.
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If there is a problem of adaptive preference formation in society, this is not an
individual problem with an individual solution or a problem that some can
solve for others through state action. Rather, it is a problem with the commu-
nication structure in which all of us form our preferences and something that
can be solved only on the basis of intersubjective processes of deliberation.
The focus on multiple dimensions of freedom entails an argument for see-
ing deliberative democracy as situated between models of democracy that
claim democracy requires that we hold that people are never wrong about
their own interests (or even if they are, that there is nothing we can do about it,
because it would violate their negative freedom) and paternalistic models that
set up independent standards of what is good for people. It is possible to raise
the issue of nonautonomous preferences without substituting one’s own judg-
ment for those of others. Public deliberation is a means of dealing with non-
autonomous preferences without becoming paternalistic. It works through its
participants’ own critical faculties and is undermined by mechanisms that
bypass these. Because of its procedural and dialogical character, deliberation
cannot impose anything on anybody. The strength of deliberative democracy
is exactly that it can challenge uncritically accepted forms of oppression
without being paternalistic and setting up external standards of true and
false interests. We only see the importance of this when we clarify the dimen-
sions of freedom to which deliberative democracy must be normatively
committed.
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